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TOO BIG TO FAIL, TOO BIG NOT TO KNOW:
FINANCIAL FIRMS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY
Z. JILL BARCLIFT*
"WHAT HAPPENS ON WALL STREET HAS REAL CONSEQUENCES ACROSS
THE COUNTRY, ACROSS OUR ECONOMY."I

In 2008, the U.S. financial markets experienced a series of cataclysmic
events that continue to dominate the economic news two years later. 2 The
financial crisis began with the collapse of the mortgaged-backed securities
market, which led to the failure of several Wall Street financial firms. 3 The
financial markets reacted to these events by freezing credit, which
contributed to U.S. and global recessions. 4 In unprecedented actions, the
federal government injected capital into the financial markets by providing
loans and equity to financial firms in order for these institutions to avoid
* Z. Jill Barclift, Associate Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law.

I Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, Remarks by the President on Wall Street Reform (Apr.
22, 2010) (on file with author), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarkspresident-wall-street-reform.
2 See Shahien Nasiripour, FinancialCrisisInvestigators Looking at Wall Street, THE HUFFINGTON
POST, Feb. 26, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/02/26/fmancial-crisisinvestign_478520
.html ("Goldman Sachs and others helped inflate the housing bubble by funding and securitizing junk
mortgages, selling them off to investors and pocketing the fees - while at the same time placing
contrary bets in the expectation that the market would eventually crash.").
3 See CHARLES R. MORRIS, THE TRILLION DOLLAR MELTDOWN 107-36 (PublicAffairs 2008)
(describing that the subprime crisis was just the beginning of the crisis in the summer of 2007); see also
Shawn Tully, What's Wrong With Wall St. and How to Fix It, 157 FORTUNE 7, at 70-76 (Apr. 14, 2008)
(explaining how things would be different following the government "clean up" of the subprime
mortgage "mess"); see also Allan Sloan & Doris Burke, On the Brink of Disaster, 157 FORTUNE 7, at
78-84 (Apr. 14, 2008) (discussing the subprime mortgage failures at Bear Stearns); see also Roddy
Boyd & Doris Burke, The Last Days of Bear Stearns, 157 FORTUNE 7, at 86-89 (Apr. 14, 2008)
(describing how it only took a few days for the Bear Stems investment bank to collapse).
4 See MORRIS, supra note 3, at 128-33 (concluding that there is and will continue to be a decline in
the availability of credit); see also Carrie Mollenkamp et al., Lehman's Demise Triggered Cash Crunch
Around Globe, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 2008, at Al (giving insight into the panic and lack of trust in the
U.S. and global markets during the few days that Lehman dissolved); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the
Treasury, Testimony by Sec'y Henry M. Paulson, Jr. Before the Senate Banking Committee on Turmoil
in U.S. Credit Markets: Recent Actions Regarding Gov't Sponsored Entities, Investment Banks and
other Financial Institutions (Sept. 23, 2008) (on file with author), available at http://www.ustreas.gov
/press/releases/hpl 153.htm (explaining the severity of financial market being frozen).
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serious financial losses or bankruptcy. 5 Many contend that the recession
fueled by the financial crisis is nearing an end; however, its underlying
causes and responses are still debated. 6
The federal government initiated a multi-agency investigation into the
conditions that caused the financial meltdown. 7 The Treasury Department
concluded that the primary triggers precipitating the financial crisis were
the lack of regulatory oversight, the risky bets of many Wall Street firms,
and transparency in the selling of collaterized debt obligations and
mortgage-backed securities by banks, investment banks, and other financial
institutions. 8
The Treasury Department announced as a regulatory priority the
assessment of systemic risks in the financial markets; and it began
5 See Deborah Solomon et al., U.S. Seals Bailout Deal, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 2008, at Al
(detailing the specifics of the bailouts and giving justification for this bill); see also Alan Murray,
Fixing Global Finance,WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2009, at RI (suggesting ways to strengthen the financial
institutions, including a demand for each institution to hold more capital).
6 See Bradford Cornell, The FundamentalNature of Recessions: A Contractingand Restructuring
Perspective, 6 ECON. VOICE 1 (2009), available at http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol6/iss9/art6 (stating
that "economic interaction is managed not through markets, but through personal plans, commitments
[such as career decisions], relationships, and contracts [including implicit contracts]," and explaining
how many of these plans are long term, resulting in a recession when these relationships were unable to
quickly respond to the changes in the financial and housing markets); see also Lucian A. Bebchuk, A
Better Planfor Addressing the FinancialCrisis,5 ECON. VOICE 1 (2008), availableat http://www.
bepress.com/ev/vol5/iss5/art6 (critiquing proposed emergency legislation); David 0. Beim, Good
Bailouts and Bad, 5 ECON. VOICE 1 (2008), available at http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol5/iss5/art8
(evaluating whether or not the recent bailout plant was good or bad); Economic Outlook: Hearing
Before the J. Econ. Comm., 11Ith Cong. (2008) (statement of Chairman Ben S. Bernanke), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bemanke20080924a.htm (discussing how "[tihe
downturn in the housing market has been a key factor underlying both the strained condition of
financial markets and the slowdown of the broader economy" and how to respond to the situation);
Luigi Zingales, Plan B, 5 ECON. VOICE 1 (2008), available at www.bepress.com/ev/vol5/iss6/art4
(explaining Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson's Plan B, and how it will not work).
7 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Statement by Sec'y Henry M. Paulson, Jr. on
Financial Markets Update (Oct. 8, 2008) (on file with author), availableat http://www.ustreas.gov
/press/releases/hpl 189.htm (discussing the EESA giving the Treasury power to liquidate bad mortgage
assets); see also Press Release, Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets, supra note 4 (describing the methods
taken by Congress to help stabilize financial markets); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury,
Financial Stability Plan (Feb. 10, 2009) (on file with author), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/
press/releases/200921022303013043.htm (explaining Congress's passage of the Capital Asset Program
to help stabilize the financial market); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Paulson Statement on
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (Oct. 3, 2008) (on file with author), available at http://www.
ustreas.gov/press/releases/hpll75.htm (describing the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
implemented by Congress to help all financial institutions); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury,
Under Sec'y David H. McCormick Remarks at Wharton's Eleventh Annual Investment Management
Conference (Oct. 3, 2008) (on file with author), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/
hpl 173.htm (discussing the root cause of the financial collapse and methods to halt the recession).
8 See Press Release, Financial Stability Plan, supra note 7 (outlining the events that led to the
turmoil of the U.S. credit markets); see also MORRIS, supra note 3, at 83-85 (discussing the history of
various financial breakdowns); Press Release, Financial Markets Update, supra note 7 (setting forth
some of the root causes of the strain to U.S. and global financial markets); Russell Roberts, How Little
We Know: The Challenges of Financial Reform, 6 ECON. VOICE 1, 3 (2009), available at
www.bepress.com/ev/vol6/issl /art3 (discussing the financial crisis).

2011]

700 BIG TO FAIL

451

identifying financial institutions it deemed "too big to fail" by establishing
procedures for a stress test on such institutions.9 A financial institution is
deemed "too big to fail" if its collapse or bankruptcy would disrupt the
capital markets in such a catastrophic way that it would push the U.S.
economy into recession or depression.' 0
Congress is currently debating legislation to increase transparency and
regulations over financial institutions.11 Omitted, however, from the
assessment of systemic risks is an evaluation of a financial firm's corporate
governance. Government stress tests do not evaluate a financial firm's
obligation to engage in good corporate governance; nor do they evaluate a
12
financial institution's corporate social responsibility.
Although a discussion of the corporate social responsibility of financial
firms seems to reengage a debate that is settled, it is a discussion worth
reconsidering in light of Wall Street's role in the current financial crisis.
Many would argue that because Wall Street firms only have a duty to
maximize shareholder wealth, there is little need to address issues of
societal harm caused by the sale of products and financial securities, such
as subprime mortgage loans. Yet, over the years, the role of corporate
social responsibility as a measure of good corporate governance has
increased as economic globalization has come to serve as the incentive. 13
9 See Press Release, Financial Stability Plan, supranote 7 (explaining the stress test used as part of
a comprehensive Capital Assistance Program designed to offset financial institutions' losses).

10 See id (discussing the capital assistance program providing large financial institutions with
"capital buffer" to absorb losses); see also GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE
HAZARDS OF BANK BAILOUTS 9 (2009) (establishing that "too big to fail is a problem of credibility," in
that "[c]reditors of large banks do not believe that the government will make them bear all their losses
from bank failure").
11 See Press Release, Remarks by the President, supra note 1 (addressing two bills within the
Senate and House regarding financial reform); see also David M. Herszenhom, Bill Passed in Senate
Broadly Expands Oversight of Wall St., N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2010, availableat http://www.nytimes
.com/2010/05/21/business/21regulate.html (discussing a bill passed by the Senate that will "touch
virtually every aspect of the financial industry").
12 See Richard A. Posner, FinancialRegulatory Reform: The Politics of Denial,6 ECON. VOICE 1,
2 (2009), available at http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol6/issll/artI (highlighting the failures of
government regulatory agencies with respect to the financial crisis rather than the private sector); see
also Douglas M. Branson, What is the "New" Corporate Social Responsibility?: Corporate Social
Responsibility Redux, 76 TuL. L. REv. 1207, 1217, 1225 (2002) (discussing corporate responsibility and
good governance).
13 See Halina Ward, Corporate Social Responsibility in Law and Policy, in PERSPECTIVES ON
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 8, 14 (Nina Boeger, Rachel Murray & Charlotte Villiers eds.,
2008) (discussing how the mainstream CSR agenda is focused on the role of market actors "to ensure
that economic globalization is supportive of social and environmental progress"); see also DAVID
MILMAN, NATIONAL CORPORATE LAW IN A GLOBALISED MARKET: THE UK EXPERIENCE IN
PERSPECTIVE 146 (Edward Elgar Publ'g Ltd. 2009) (expressing the need for social moral
responsibility); Cynthia A. Williams, CorporationsTheory and CorporateGovernance Law: Corporate
Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 720-21 (2002)
(discussing transnational economic activity in the globalizing economy).
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Several Wall Street financial firms have significant corporate social
responsibility initiatives focused on philanthropy and the environment. 14
However, the financial crisis has brought into sharper focus the
connection between Wall Street and Main Street by demonstrating the link
As the
between financial firms' products and societal well-being.
President's recent comments indicate, what happens on Wall Street has
broader consequences for our economy.
This article reconsiders the debate over the role of corporate social
responsibility as a governance tool to monitor the behavior of management
in financial firms that have been identified by the federal government as
"too big to fail." Financial institutions deemed critical to the economy
must have corporate governance processes in which board and management
decision-making is not only reliable and transparent, but is also engaged in
the utmost rigor in assessing profitability and economic viability in
financial markets and the communities in which they compete.
Part one of this Article explores the link between products sold by Wall
Street financial firms and broader societal harm, particularly to local
communities. Part one examines the meaning of "too big to fail" and the
criteria by which the government identifies a financial institution as critical
to the economy. This part also looks at the role of sub-prime mortgage
lending in the financial crisis, and explores how Wall Street firms enabled
sub-prime mortgage lending in communities. Part one further examines the
negative effects of securitization and sub-prime mortgages on local
communities, and evaluates the connection between Wall Street financial
products and societal harm. Additionally, part one examines the litigation
surrounding sub-prime mortgages and the effort to hold various parties
involved in sub-prime mortgage lending legally accountable. This part
14 See, e.g, CorporateSocial Responsibility at Citi, http://www.citibank.ro/en/desprenoi/
responsabilitate-sociala-la-citi.html (last visited June 25, 2010) ("Citi has long been committed to
making the communities in which it operates better," focusing on microfinance and
microentrepreneurship, small and growing businesses, education, financial education, asset building,
and the environment, and engaging in Global Community Day and Volunteer Program in Romania);
Wells Fargo in the Community, https://www.wellsfargo.com/about/csr/ (last visited June 25, 2010)
(giving hope by providing an average of $553,425 per day to nonprofits and donating 1.23 million
employee volunteer hours in 2009); Citizenship: CorporateEngagement,, http://www2.goldmansachs.
com/citizenship/index.html (last visited July 18, 2010) (stressing the firm's commitment to assisting
communities worldwide through financial support to areas such as small businesses, education, and the
environment); About Bank ofAmerica: In the Community, http://www.bankofamerica.com/index.cfm?
page=about (last visited July 18, 2010) (discussing how Bank of America is "investing in our
communities and our economy"); see also What Does the FutureHold For This Country, http://www.
bankofamerica.com/global/hs home/pdflCSRBrochure Final.pdf (discussing Bank of America's CSR
initiatives); Phil Mattera, Corporate Social Irresponsibility, DIRT DIGGERS DIGEST, May 17, 2010,
http://www.southemstudies.org/2010/05/corporate-social-irresponsibility.html (discussing companies
that claim to have enlightened policies on environmental and social policies).
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suggests that the increasing amount of litigation against parties involved in
the securitizations is a wake-up call for financial firms to not only properly
document their loans, but to engage in greater scrutiny of the supply chain
for consumer mortgages in order to understand moral hazard risks.
Part two explores the efficacy debate over corporate social
responsibility's role in corporate governance. This part explores the
evolution of corporate social responsibility as a corporate governance tool
and examines the limitations of corporate social responsibility in
effectuating corporate governance changes. This part also argues that the
lack of a concise meaning for corporate social responsibility has allowed
financial firms to define corporate social responsibility as the completion of
good deeds or a moral checklist for corporate conduct. As financial firms
have focused on philanthropy and the environment to assess corporate
social responsibility, they have failed to address a more meaningful
corporate social responsibility in which products sold and societal harm are
evaluated and disclosed to shareholders.
Part three calls for a concise definition of corporate social responsibility
for financial firms deemed critical to the U.S. economy. This part argues
for mandatory corporate social responsibility compliance and disclosures.
Further, part three of the article examines how the financial crisis has
changed the regulatory environment for financial institutions. This part
identifies ways in which the new regulatory regime presents an opportunity
to implement corporate social responsibility as part of good corporate
governance for financial firms critical to economic stability. The article
concludes by recommending a corporate social responsibility definition for
"too big to fail" financial firms and by suggesting mandatory compliance
via disclosure. It argues for improved disclosure of corporate social
responsibility accounting.
I. "Too BIG To FAIL" AND THE "STRESS TEST"
The phrase "too big to fail" refers to a banking or financial organization
so large that the federal government must support and prevent the collapse
of the institution because its failure poses a significant risk to the entire
financial and economic systems.15 Although economists disagree whether
15 See STERN, supra note 10, at 1, 12 (noting that big banks "play an important role in a country's
financial system and economic performance" and that their failure is "seen as posing significant risks to
...

the financial system as a whole . . . ."); see also David Cho, Banks 'Too Big to Fail' Have Grown

Even Bigger, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpthat
(expressing
dyn/content/article/2009/08/27/AR2009082704193.html?sid=ST2009090801107
"[w]hen the credit crisis struck last year, federal regulators pumped tens of billions of dollars into the
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government protection of creditors for economic loss is warranted, the
policy behind government bailouts of large financial institutions is to
reduce the risk of bank failures or capital market freezes, which may result
from the collapse of a large financial institution. 16
The purpose of the Treasury Department's Financial Stability Plan is to
identify financial institutions whose collapse would have negative effects
on capital markets.' 7 Key points of the Treasury Department's stress test
call for increased transparency, accountability, and monitoring of financial
institutions receiving federal funds.18 After identifying major financial
institutions, the government proposes to determine whether the financial
institutions have the capital to lend and absorb losses in the event of a
severe economic downturn.19
Financial institutions passing the stress test will be permitted to access a
government funded capital buffer. 20 The capital buffer serves as a
"contingent equity" providing financial firms with access to capital in the
nation's leading financial institutions because the banks were so big that officials feared their failure
would ruin the entire financial system.").
16 See STERN, supra note 10, at 1, 12 (stating that "[d]etermining the appropriate policy response to
an important failing bank has long been a vexing public policy issue," and that "[t]he failure of a large
banking organization is seen as posing significant risks to other financial institutions ... and possibly to
the economic and social order;" because there is a "chance that one bank's failure can spill over and
threaten the viability of other banks"); see also Cornell, supra note 6, at 2-3 (discussing why there is
reason to be pessimistic about "whether the government can do anything to speed the restructuring
process or reduce its cost"); Bebchuk, supra note 6, at 1-2 (critiquing the U.S. Treasury Department's
proposed emergency legislation to purchase "troubled assets" from financial institutions); Beim, supra
note 6, at 1-2 (describing good bailouts versus bad bailouts, and how it is hard to tell whether the
current bailout plans are good or bad); Zingales, supra note 6, at 1-2 (setting forth the possible
problems of bailing out Wall Street); Luc Laeven & Fabian Valencia, Systemic Banking Crises: A New
Database 3-4 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/08/224, 2008) (discussing how
"[c]hoosing the best way of resolving a financial crisis and accelerating economic recovery is far from
unproblematic," and how empirical research shows that "providing assistance to banks and their
borrowers can be counterproductive, resulting in increased losses to banks, which often abuse
forbearance to take unproductive risks at government expense.").
17 See Press Release, Financial Stability Plan, supra note 7 ("To address the financial crisis, the
Financial Stability Plan is designed to attack our credit crisis on all fronts . . .. To be successful, we
must address the uncertainty, troubled assets and capital constraints of our financial institutions as well
as the frozen secondary markets that have been the source of around half of our lending for everything
from small business loans to auto loans.").
18 See id. (stating that "the Financial Stability Plan will institute a new era of accountability,
transparency and conditions on the financial institutions receiving funds."); see also Angel Gurria,
Partnering to Strengthen Public Governance: The Leadership Challenge for CEOs and Boards,
WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM 5 (Jan. 2008), availableat http://www.weforum.org/documents/PR/GCCI
Report 2008011 .pdf (discussing how both the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development and the Global Corporate Citizenship Initiative stress transparency).
19 See Press Release, Financial Stability Plan, supra note 7 (articulating that through the "stress
test" the government will assess "whether major financial institutions have the capital necessary to
continue lending and to absorb the potential losses that could result from a more severe decline in the
economy than projected").
20 See id. (noting that "a financial institution that has undergone a comprehensive 'stress test' will
have access to a Treasury provided 'capital buffer"').
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event that lending conditions worsen. 21 Additionally, in order to address
the freezing-up of lending in secondary markets and securitizations, the
government designed a lending program to provide financing to private
investors so to help unfreeze lending markets and improve consumer
lending.22
The Treasury Department's stress test will likely identify future
institutions engaged in risky lending practices or those with risky assets on
their books.23 Implementation of the stress tests may also prevent the
failure of individual financial institutions and minimize the cascade of
failures in the capital market. 24 Yet, the current financial crisis had many
accelerative events, which resulted in risky lending practices for financial
institutions. Sub-prime mortgage lending and securitization are identified
as key accelerants of the financial crisis.25 They have had the most direct
impact on consumers and together provide the most demonstrative link
between Wall Street products and local community well-being.
A. The FinancialCrisis - Securitization and Sub-prime Lending
The risky bets of Wall Street firms have had a dramatic effect on our
communities in many ways. 26 In the process known as securitization,
financial firms purchased mortgages from mortgage brokers, banks, and
other lenders, and bundled the mortgages into securitized assets. 27
Financial firms' insatiable appetite for the securitized assets created a
21 See id ("[Tihe Financial Stability Trust will provide a capital buffer that will: [o]perate as a
form of "contingent equity" to ensure firms the capital strength to preserve or increase lending in a
worse than expected economic downturn.").
22 See Press Release, Financial Stability Plan, supra note 7 (discussing how "[t]he Consumer and
Business Lending Initiative will support the purchase of loans by providing the financing to private
investors to help unfreeze and lower interest rates ..... ).
23 See Press Release, Financial Markets Update, supra note 7 (noting that the Department of the
Treasury plans to use more oversight in the future).
24 See id. (stating that part of the strategy of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act "is
designed to mitigate financial market disruption when a bank fails").
25 Senator Charles E. Schumer, Sheltering Neighborhoodsfrom the Subprime ForeclosureStorm,
Special Report by the Joint Economic Committee (2007), available at http://jec.senate.gov/archivel
Documents/Reports/subprime I apr2007revised.pdf (discussing how "it has become increasingly clear
that irresponsible subprime lending practices have been contributing to a wave of foreclosures that are
hitting homeowners and rattling the housing markets.").
26 See id (highlighting the current financial effects of the subprime mortgage crisis).
27 See Adam B. Ashcraft & Til Schuermann, Understanding the Securitization of Subprime
Mortgage Credit, FED. REs. BANK N.Y. STAFF REP. No. 318, at 2-3 (2008) (discussing how "the
securitization of mortgage loans is a complex process that involves a number of different players."); see
also Taylor D. Nadauld & Shane M. Sherlund, The Role of the Securitization Process in the Expansion
of Subprime Credit 2 (Fin. & Econ. Disc. Series, Working Paper No. 2009-28, 2009) (on file with
author) (commenting that banks were not stupid when making subprime loans: "they passed the buck to
other people" by securitizing them).
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morally hazardous environment where fraud and unscrupulous mortgages
increased as Wall Street financial firms continued to look for mortgage
loans to sell in the secondary market. 28
Securitization is the process of pooling consumer mortgages and selling
the pooled mortgages as a separate security. 29 The underlying consumer
mortgage is separated from the security instrument sold by financial firms
in the secondary securitization market.30 A trustee is ultimately the owner
of record of the consumer mortgage. 3 1
Securitization of loans is highly profitable for financial institutions. 3 2
The lenders and financial institutions involved in the securitization process
reaped financial rewards for originating consumer mortgages, servicing, or
selling the bundled assets to other financial firms.33 Because financial firms
had to sell the securitized assets, the originator of the loan held no
responsibility for the quality of the loan, and the ultimate owner of the
consumer mortgage had no concern for the consequences of the loan on the
consumer. 34 Moreover, the financial institution selling the mortgagebacked securitized asset took no responsibility for the terms of the
underlying loan, and no one in the securitization chain cared about whether
the consumer could ultimately afford or repay the loan.35 The financial
28 See Nadauld, supra note 27 (stating how banks were making dubious loans); see also Michael G.
Crouhy et al., The Subprime Credit Crisis of 07, 5, 7, 11 (July 9, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1112467 (suggesting that the process of
securitization led many loan originators to commit fraud and other questionable acts); see generallyThe
Joint Economic Committee, Subprime Mortgage Market Crisis Timeline (2007), available at
http://www.criminallawlibraryblog.com/subprime crisis timeline.pdf
29 See Asheraft, supra note 27, at 6 (highlighting how the "pool of mortgage loans is sold by the
arranger to a bankruptcy-remote trust, which is a special-purpose vehicle that issues debt to investors.");
see also Nadauld, supra note 27, at 49 (discussing how "[p]ools of subprime loans are originated by
retail banks or mortgage brokers and subsequently sold to private financial intermediaries," often "Wall
Street firms . . . .").
30 See Ashcraft, supranote 27, at 6 (mentioning how a credit risk transfer "protects investors from
); see also Nadauld, supra note 27, at 49 (noting how
bankruptcy of the originator or arranger ....
pools of loans are put into remote bankruptcy trusts, which is a separate legal entity).
31 See Ashcraft, supra note 27, at 6 (noting how the "pool of mortgage loans is sold by the arranger
to a bankruptcy-remote trust"); see also Nadauld, supra note 27, at 49 (suggesting the presence of a
trustee due to the bankruptcy remote trust).
32 See Asheraft, supra note 27, at 6-7 (stating that "the trust protects both the originator and
arranger from losses on the mortgage loans"). See generally MORRIS, supra note 3, at 59-85, 87-105
(discussing the current cost and profit of subprime mortgages as well as the value of the United States
dollar).
33 See Ashcraft, supra note 27, at 5 ("[T]he originator might sell a portfolio of loans with an initial
principal balance of $100 million for $102 million, corresponding to a gain on sale of $2 million. The
buyer is willing to pay this premium because of anticipated interest payments on the principal."); see
also Nadauld, supra note 27, at 21 (explaining how regulatory capital arbitrage generates profits for
lenders and financial institutions).
34 See Crouhy et al., supra note 28, at 5 (discussing how originators did not care about the value of
the loans because they passed on the losses to the trusts).
35 See Asheraft, supra note 27, at 11-12 (explaining how the various frictions between the parties
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incentives in the securitization processes rewarded volume, thereby
exacerbating the moral hazard problem.36
B. Sub-prime Lending

In order to meet the demands for mortgages that could be sold to Wall
Street financial firms, lenders increasingly designed loan products for subprime borrowers so as to increase the pool of consumer mortgages that
could be securitized. 37 Sub-prime mortgages are loans to borrowers with
low credit scores or limited credit history. 38 Sub-prime mortgages carry
higher interest rates and are typically tied to adjustable rate mortgages. 39 A
federal report indicates that sub-prime mortgage loans were more

involved in the subprime mortgage market allowed for predatory borrowing, predatory lending, and the
abandonment of due diligence); see also Nadauld, supra note 27, at 6 (noting that "the prospect of
selling loans to secondary markets reduces lenders' incentives to screen borrowers carefully"); Crouhy
et al., supra note 28, at 5 (explaining how each party in the securitization chain avoided or absorbed the
losses from defaulted subprime loans).
36 See Ashcraft, supra note 27, at 74 ("The parties involved at ComFed exaggerated property
values to increase the volume-oriented commissions that they received for originating loans. To
increase underwriting volumes still more, ComFed employees granted loans to unqualified borrowers
by concealing the fact that these obligors had financed down payments with second-lien mortgages.");
see also Crouhy et al., supra note 28, at 11 (explaining how the compensation package for brokers was
based on the volume of loans originated); John M. Quigley, Compensation and Incentives in the
Mortgage Business, ECON. VOICE 1 (2008), available at http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol5/iss6/art2
("[E]ach specialized party to the mortgage had fee-based compensation that motivated a large volume
of transactions with little or no concern about the performance of the mortgages.").
37 See Ashcraft, supra note 27, at 2 (explaining a table that illustrates the increases in subprime
origination and issuance during the years that an increased amount of these loans were sold to
investors); see also Nadauld, supranote 27 app. § Ia (pointing out that subprime loans used to represent
a small portion of total mortgage originations until Wall Street firms began buying them); Crouhy et al.,
supra note 28, at 4, 5 (explaining why subprime mortgages were in demand, tracking the marketshare
growth of subprime mortgages, and stating that there was pressure to increase the supply of subprime
mortgages as a result of investor demand).
38 See Ashcraft, supra note 27, at 14 ("The 2001 Interagency Expanded Guidance for Subprime
Lending Programs defines the subprime borrower as one who generally displays a range of credit risk
characteristics, including one or more of the following: [t]wo or more 30-day delinquencies in the last
12 months, or one or more 60-day delinquencies in the last 24 months; [j]udgment, foreclosure,
repossession, or charge-off in the prior 24 months; [b]ankruptcy in the last 5 years; [r]elatively high
default probability as evidenced by, for example, a credit bureau risk score (FICO) of 660 or below
(depending on the product/collateral), or other bureau or proprietary scores with an equivalent default
probability likelihood; and/or, [d]ebt service-to-income ratio of 50 percent or greater; or, otherwise
limited ability to cover family living expenses after deducting total debt-service requirements from
monthly income."); see also Nadauld, supra note 27, app. § Ia (describing the basic characteristics of a
subprime mortgage); Crouhy et al., supranote 28, at 50 n. 1 ("The term 'subprime' refers to mortgagees
who are unable to qualify for prime mortgage rates. Reasons for this include poor credit histories
(payment delinquencies, charge offs, bankruptcies, low credit scores, large existing liabilities, high loan
to value ratios).").
39 Chris Mayer & Karen Pence, Subprime Mortgages: What, Where, and to Whom? 2 Fin. & Econ.
Disc. Series, Working Paper No. 2008-29 (2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/
2008/200829/200829pap.pdf (discussing the different sources of data on subprime mortgages, including
mortgages with higher interest rates).
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predominate in low-income communities. 4 0
Low income communities and communities of color were more likely to
be the victims of fraudulent and unscrupulous mortgage broker practices,
including the selling of sub-prime mortgage loans and predatory lending. 4 1
These practices resulted in increased foreclosures, as families could no
longer afford their homes when adjustable interest rate loans increased their
mortgage payments to excessive levels. 42 Sub-prime mortgage foreclosures
make up a significant percentage of foreclosures, further fueling the
financial crisis. 4 3
Foreclosures harm families by decreasing family stability, harming credit
ratings, and decreasing a significant source of family wealth. 44 Not only do
individual families directly experience the devastation of foreclosure, but
communities suffer as well. Communities with a high percentage of
subprime mortgage loans also experience high rates of foreclosure. 4 5
40 See U.S. Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., Unequal Burden: Income and Racial Disparities in
Subprime Lending in America (2000), available at http://www.huduser.org/portal/publications/fairhsg
/unequal.html ("The data clearly demonstrate the rapid growth of subprime lending during the 1990's
and, further, the disproportionate concentration of such lending in the nation's minority and low-income
neighborhoods."); see also John C. Coffee Jr., What Went Wrong? A Tragedy In Three Acts, 6 U. St.
Thomas L.J. 403, 405 (2009) (stating that "[b]etween 2001 and 2006, the availability of mortgage funds
increased sharply, with most of this increase being channeled to poorer communities").
41 See Mayer, supra note 39, at 1-2 (discussing the results of research on subprime mortgages,
including findings that these mortgages are concentrated in locations with high proportions of black and
Hispanic residents); see also U.S. Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., supra note 40 ("Since subprime
lending often operates outside of the federal regulatory structure, it is a fertile ground for predatory
lending activities, such as excessive fees, the imposition of single premium credit life insurance and
prepayment penalties. The recent acceleration in predatory lending activity has accompanied the growth
in subprime lending over the past decade."); Schumer, supra note 25 (discussing subprime mortgages
and how studies show that they are most prevalent in lower-income neighborhoods with high
concentrations of minorities; for instance, in 2005, 53 percent of African Americans and 37.8 percent of
Hispanic borrowers took out subprime mortgages, and subprime mortgages were 5 times more likely to
be found in predominately black neighborhoods than predominately white neighborhoods); Jennifer E.
Bethel et al., Legal and Economic Issues in LitigationArising From the 2007-2008 Credit Crisis, 16
Harvard Law Sch. Program on Risk and Reg., Discussion Paper No. 08-5 (2008), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-10965582 (setting forth evidence that "at least some mortgage bankers and
brokers may have submitted false appraisals and financial information to qualify otherwise unqualified
households for subprime mortgage loans").
42 See U.S. Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., supra note 40 (cautioning that "predatory lending can
have disastrous consequences for the unknowing borrower," such as equity being stripped from the
home or the even having the home stripped from its owner altogether).
43 See U.S. Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., Office of Pol'y Dev. & Res., Report to Congress on
the Root Causes of the Foreclosure Crisis, vi (2010), availableat http://www.huduser.orgfPublications/
PDF/Foreclosure_09.pdf ("Most of the initial increase in foreclosures was driven by subprime loans,
both due to the fact that these inherently risky loans had come to account for a much larger share of the
mortgage market in recent years and because the foreclosure rates among these loans were rising
rapidly.").
44 See Schumer, supra note 25, at 14 (discussing the costs of foreclosures on families).
45 See U.S. Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., supra note 40 (noting that foreclosure is a relatively
more "egregious" case); see also SCHUMER, supra note25, at 14 (listing some of the negative effects of
foreclosures).

2011]

TOO BIG TO FAIL

459

Neighborhoods with increased foreclosed properties experience an overall
decline in home values, safety, and community continuity. 46 Increased
foreclosures in neighborhoods likewise negatively impacts cities. 4 7
Foreclosures put downward pressure on housing prices, which results in
significant costs to cities and local governments. 48 Neighborhoods with
significant foreclosures experience an overall drop in home prices. 49
In neighborhoods with high foreclosure rates, a phenomenon known as
"spillover" occurs, in which home values decrease for the entire
community.5 0 Additionally, in low-income communities where there are a
greater percentage of multi-family buildings, many rent-paying families
face eviction when their apartment rentals are foreclosed. 5 1
C. Sub-prime Litigation
A variety of lawsuits have been filed by a host of different plaintiffs
seeking relief from the consequences of the mortgage meltdown. This has
increased the litigation risks of subprime mortgages and securitizations. 52
Securitization servicers, trustees, loan originators, and guarantors have
been the targets of lawsuits by investors, homeowners, and political groups
seeking to protect homeowners or tenants from eviction. 5 3 Several cities
have also sued originators seeking accountability for the epidemic
46 See Schumer, supra note 25, at 15-16 (discussing the costs of foreclosures on families,
businesses, city and local governments, and neighboring homeowners).
47 See id. at 15 (noting, as an example, that foreclosures lead to cities losing tax revenue).
48 See id. (discussing how costly foreclosures can be for city and local governments, especially
when the foreclosures result in property vacancies).
49 See id. at 15 (explaining how home foreclosures negatively affect the prices that neighboring
homeowners can get for their properties, and noting that "[a] recent study calculated that a single-family
home foreclosure lowers the value of homes located within one-eighth of a mile (or one city block) by
an average of 0.9 percent, and more so in a low to moderate-income community (1.4 percent).").
50 See id. at 15-16 (noting that "the bulk of the spillover costs of foreclosure are concentrated
among the nation's most vulnerable households").
51 See The Annie Casey Foundation, Building Family Economic Success: Foreclosure 1 (August
2009) (indicating that "40 percent of families facing eviction are renters").
52 See George S. Oldfield, Expanding Subprime Mortgage Crisis Increases Litigation Risks, THE
BRATELE GROUP, 1,3 (2008), availableat http://www.brattle.com/_documents/UploadLibrary/Upload
667.pdf (discussing how originators, servicers, guarantors, and securitizers of subprime loans face
increased exposure to legal actions, and how "[s]everal hundred private actions related to alleged
problems with subprime mortgages have been initiated in the last year").
53 See Robert J. Coughlin, Caught in the Cross-fire: Securitization Trustees and Litigation During
the Subprime Crisis (Sept. 18, 2009) http://www.nixonpeabody.com/linked_media/publications/
securitization litigation subprime-crisis.pdf (addressing Amendola v. Deutsche Bank, a complaint filed
in 2008 in Southern California, where homeowners facing foreclosure included the securitization trustee
along with the loan originator and loan servicer as defendants in an action to enjoin foreclosure and
recover damages, based primarily on alleged truth in lending action and RESPA violations); see also
Oldfield, supra note 52, at I (explaining that this exposure to legal action is a result of these loans being
major sources of collateral for securitized deals held by various types of investment funds).
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foreclosures in communities. 54 Insurance companies have sued as well,
seeking to nullify mortgage pool policies issued on home equity loan
securitizations. 55 The many lawsuits filed in connection with sub-prime
mortgages and securitizations are fact specific with fact specific
outcomeS. 56 The issues involve either violation of securities laws or breach
of contract claims between sophisticated contracting parties.5 7
D. Lenders
In an example of litigation by a lender, Chase Bank sued Advanta for
breach of federal securities laws and breach of contract in Chase
ManhattanMortgage Corp. v. Advanta Corp.58 Chase purchased sub-prime
mortgage loans originated by Advanta. 59 The bank then alleged that
Advanta failed to disclose certain delinquency information required by
contract. 60 Awarding Chase damages for a breach of contract claim, the
court concluded that as a sophisticated contracting party, Chase had failed
to engage in its own due diligence regarding the sub-prime loans it
purchased. 6 1 Indeed, commentators agree that courts are unlikely to find a
duty or reliance by sophisticated parties in an arm's-length securitization
contract. 62
54 See Coughlin, supra note 53 (discussing the Whittiker case, filed in the Northern District of
Ohio, which was a class action suit against a securitization trustee, the servicers, and the servicers' legal
counsel, alleging that defendants engaged in a pattern and practice of seeking and obtaining foreclosure
judgments by filing foreclosure actions without first recording the mortgage assignments).
55 See Oldfield, supra note 52, at 3 (outlining the insurance problems that resulted from the
subprime mortgage crisis and the disputes that are arising from these problems); see also Coughlin,
supra note 53, at 5 (discussing Radian Insurance, Inc. v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, an
action brought by a mortgage pool insurer seeking to nullify mortgage pool policies that it used in a
series of home equity loan securitizations).
56 See John C. Murray, Lender-Liability Issues in Securitized Mortgage Loans 1, I (2008),
http://www.firstam.com/ekcms/uploadedFiles/firstam-corn/References/ReferenceArticles/JohnCMu
rrayReference/Foreclosures/securitized-mortgages.pdf (introducing the issues involved in lenderliability cases dealing with originating and servicing securitized mortgage loans).
57 See id. at 9 (elaborating on the court's holding in Chase Manhattan Corp. v. Advanta Corp.); see
also Oldfield, supra note 52, at 3 (discussing the types of litigation that have arisen from the subprime
mortgage crisis).
58 No. CIV.A.01-507-KAJ, 2005 WL 2234608 (D. Del., Sept. 8, 2005).
59 Id. at *2 ("Advanta sold, and Chase purchased, the residential interests in 30 AdvantaSponsored Closed-End Mortgage Securitizations").
60 Id. at * 16 ("Chase alleges that Advanta did not adequately disclose all advances on zero balance
loans because Advanta did not disclose delinquent interest advances, one type of advance on zero
balance loans. . . .").
61 Id. at * 17 ("A party such as Chase, sophisticated in investor accounting, could be expected to
understand that the chart on the first page does not purport to show delinquent interest advances, being
that delinquent interest advances are different from the escrow advances or corporate advances
disclosed in the chart.").
62 See Murray, supra note 56, at II ("'[C]ourts normally will not attribute either duty or reliance
by the parties to a securitization contract, due to an arm's length nature of the transaction and
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A potential obstacle for lawsuits against mortgage servicers or lenders is
the recently enacted Helping Families Save Their Home Act of 2009,
which provides a safe harbor from litigation to mortgage servicers who
agree to loan modifications in compliance with the Act. 63 The Act will
likely limit lawsuits against servicers and trustees. 64
E. MortgageInsurers
Mortgage insurers have also found it difficult to hold the originators of
subprime loans responsible for mortgage defaults. In United Guaranty
Mortgage Indemnity Co. v. Countrywide Financial Corp., an insurer of
securitized sub-prime mortgages sought recovery against the mortgage
lender and the securitization trustee. 65 Countrywide obtained mortgage
insurance from United Guaranty on a series of securitized mortgage
loans. 66 Countrywide purchased the mortgage insurance to shift some of
the risk of default from Countrywide to United Guaranty. 67 Such mortgage
insurance would cover Countrywide's losses in the event of foreclosure and
sale of a mortgaged property. 68 United Guaranty argued that it relied on
information provided by Countrywide to decide whether to insure the
mortgages. 69 Eleven of the policies insured by United Guaranty were subprime mortgage loans originated by Countrywide. 70 United Guaranty
alleged that Countrywide falsely represented the underwriting standards for
policies with sub-prime loans and sought recovery based on negligence,
sophistication of the parties which .. . are almost always both financial institutions."') (citing Robert M.
Abrams, Securitization Disputes - Negligence/Fraud/NegligentMisrepresentation, 8 BUS. & COMM.
LITG. FED. CTS. § 90:13 (2d ed.) (2007)).
63 Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, § 201, 123 Stat. 1632
(2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of titles 12, 15, & 42 of the United States Code).
64 See Coughlin, supra note 53, at 8 (discussing Greenwich Financial Services Distressed
Mortgage Fund 3, LLC and QEB LLC v. Countrywide Financial Corporation, Countrywide Home
Loans Inc. and Country Home Loans Servicing LP, in which a federal judge in New York rejected an
argument by Countrywide that the Act essentially precludes the plaintiffs from trying to assert their
rights under MBS contracts).
65 660 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1168 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
66 Id. at 1169 ("In the securitizations, Countrywide affiliates conveyed a pool of mortgages to a
first trustee. In exchange for the mortgages, this first trustee issued debt instruments that represent a
right to proceeds from trust assets (such as incoming mortgage payments by homeowners or, perhaps,
mortgage insurance proceeds).").
67 Id. ("Countrywide and a second trustee, BNY Trust, obtained mortgage insurance on a subset of
the securitized loans from United Guaranty.").
68 See id. at 1171 ("Mortgage insurance covers the difference between the lender's loss 'after
foreclosure and sale' of mortgaged property.").
69 Id. at 1172 (referencing United Guaranty's Amended Complaint, which stated that as a result of
its "delegated model" for underwriting Countrywide loans, United Guaranty relied on Countrywide to
represent information on the loans being insured).
70 Id. (providing background information on the eleven insurance policies at issue in the lawsuit).
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negligent misrepresentation, and fraudulent inducement, as well as other
breach of contract claims. 7 1 The court concluded that this case involved
sophisticated parties to a contract who negotiated to handle various risks.
Thus, since the contract agreed upon between United Guaranty and
Countrywide provided remedies for claims of fraud and negligence, 72 the
court denied United Guaranty's contract, tort, and statutory claims. 73
Further, an interesting complaint filed by a mortgage insurer sought a
declaratory judgment stating that the mortgage pool insurer was entitled to
rescind each of the mortgage insurance policies as a result of materially
false representations and warranties made concerning the quality of the
mortgage pool, which induced it to issue the insurance policies. 74
F. Shareholders/Investors
Shareholders/investors have had some success in bringing securities
fraud claims against lenders and originators. In In re Countrywide
Financial Corp. Derivative Litigation, a shareholder derivative action and
class action alleged breaches of fiduciary duty and other violations. 75
Shareholders alleged that the defendant breached securities laws by making
false and misleading statements in proxy documents concerning mortgagebacked securities. 76 In allowing the securities fraud claims to proceed, the
court concluded that the shareholders raised enough strong inferences with
respect to certain directors for violation of federal securities laws and that
the requirements for demand futility were satisfied. 77
However, shareholders/investors must satisfy the high standards for
pleading scienter in securities litigation. In In re Radian Securities
Litigation, a group of investors who purchased securities backed by sub71 Id at 1170, 1172 (outlining the allegations and claims in United Guaranty's Amended
Complaint).
72 Id at 1188 ("Here, sophisticated business entities agreed to contractually handle claims fraud by
the insured. These contract terms therefore subsume any tort remedy for claims fraud.").
73 Id. at 1170 (dismissing United Guaranty's claims for fraudulent inducement, negligent
misrepresentation, negligence, and rescission, with prejudice as to all defendants).
74 Radian Ins., Inc. v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., No. 08-2993, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92197,
at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 1, 2009) (stating the action requested by the plaintiff that this decision addresses);
see Coughlin, supra note 53, at 5 (discussing the plaintiffs request for relief in Radian Insurance,Inc.).
75 554 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1049 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (noting that the plaintiffs' complaint was entitled
"Consolidated Shareholder Derivative Action and Class Action Complaint for Breaches of Fiduciary
Duty, Aiding and Abetting Breaches of Fiduciary Duty, and Violations of the California and Federal
Securities Laws").
76 Id. at 1053-54 (noting that plaintiffs' complaint alleges that defendants made false and
misleading claims in press releases and conference calls, SEC filings, proxy statements, and statements
about Countrywide's position).
77 Id. at 1083 (discussing which claims were granted and which claims were denied).
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prime mortgage assets alleged the Radian Group had engaged in securities
fraud. 78 Dismissing the complaint, the court concluded that the plaintiffs
had failed to demonstrate the elements of securities fraud, including
scienter. 79
G. Homeowners
Homeowners also have had limited success in bringing claims against
parties involved in subprime lending and securitization. In Pontiflet-Moore
v. GMA4C Mortgage, a homeowner who was foreclosed upon sought relief,
alleging she was defrauded into refinancing her home.80 The homeowner
claimed that the loan officer of a mortgage brokerage solicited and
defrauded her by convincing her to take out a loan to refinance her home. 8 1
The homeowner alleged various violations of state and federal consumer
lending laws with respect to the sub-prime mortgage. 8 2 The homeowner's
complaint was dismissed based primarily on poorly drafted pleadings. 83
H. Municipalities
In City of Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mortgage Securities, Inc., the cities
of Cleveland and Buffalo sued mortgage brokers seeking to recover for
harm caused by foreclosures under a variety of theories, including violation
of public nuisance laws. 84 The defendants successfully moved to dismiss
the complaint. The district court held that since the cities permitted and
encouraged sub-prime mortgage lending by government regulation, they
could not later claim such products were a public nuisance.8 5
A likely outcome from the flood of litigation involving securitized subprime mortgage assets is that originators, servicers, lenders, homeowners,
and investors will improve documentation by all those involved in the
securitization process. 86 Some of these lawsuits may serve to improve
78 612 F. Supp. 2d 594, 596 (2009).
79 Id. at 623 ("The plaintiffs have not met their burden under PSLRA of alleging a strong inference
of scienter . . . . The plaintiffs inference of scienter is neither cogent, nor compelling, nor strong in
light of competing inferences, and a reasonable person would not deem the inference of scienter cogent
and at least as compelling as any nonculpable inference.").
80 No. 2:09-cv-01685-MCE-DAD, 2010 WL 432076, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2010).
81 Id.
82 Id
83 Id. at *6-9, *11 (discussing the various shortcomings of plaintiffs' complaint).
84 621 F. Supp. 2d 513 (N.D. Ohio 2009); see Coughlin, supra note 53, at 4 (explaining
Cleveland's claim of public nuisance).
85 Id. at 536.
86 See Eugene R. Licker, Subprime Mortgage Meltdown Litigation - A Look Ahead (2008),
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corporate governance at all financial institutions as firms seek to manage
litigation risk. However, managing litigation risk does little to improve
proactive management of the risk of moral hazard.
The connection between the products sold by financial firms derived
from consumer mortgages, and the ultimate foreclosure crisis in lowincome communities has not only fueled a recession, but has harmed
families and neighborhoods alike. 87 Because the market for mortgagedbacked securities lacked regulatory transparency, institutions and regulators
had no idea of the potential domino effect that the collapse of the sub-prime
market would have on the economy. 88 Management and directors of
financial firms approved the purchase and selling of mortgaged-backed
products because they were highly profitable for financial firms. 89 There
was no corporate governance mechanism requiring financial firms to focus
on the risk posed to the communities being targeted for sub-prime lending.
Corporate social responsibility offers the opportunity to address the
corporate governance failures at "too big to fail" financial institutions. A
corporate social responsibility strategy, in which financial products based
on consumer loans are assessed for their impact on communities, ties a
financial firm's profitability to its long-term viability. If financial firms
properly analyze the risks of their financial products from a corporate
social responsibility perspective, they can potentially reduce not only
financial losses and litigation risks, but also societal harm. 90 Corporate
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/current.php?artType-view&artMonth=April&artYear-2008&Entry
No=8116 (noting how some lawsuits will claim that those holding interests did not properly assess the
value of the securities). See generally, Raymond H. Brescia, Tainted Loans: Towards a Mass Torts
Approach to Subprime Mortgage Litigation (2009), available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/view
content.cgi?article=1003&context-raymond-brescia (discussing the use of mass torts litigation as a
means to correct the subprime mortgage crisis and how one of the problems that caused the crisis was
people being given loans without proper documentation).
87 See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comn'n, SEC Charges Goldman Sachs With Fraudin
Structuringand Marketing of CDO Tied to Subprime Mortgages. (Apr. 16, 2010) available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-59.htm; see also Schumer, supra note 25, at 14-16
(discussing the costs of foreclosures on low-income families, city and local governments, and
neighboring homeowners); U.S. Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., supranote 40 ("The data clearly
demonstrate the rapid growth of subprime lending during the 1990's and, further, the disproportionate
concentration of such lending in the nation's minority and low-income neighborhoods").
88 See Richard E. Mendales, CollateralizedExplosive Devices: Why Securities Regulation Failed
to Prevent the CDO Meltdown, and How to Fix It, 2009 U. ILL. L. REv. 1359, 1361 (2009) (finding that
the crisis began and was powered by the ratings not being worth their face amounts, due to the common
failure in transparency of securities law, which was an underlying issue that led to the financial market
letdown).
89 See id. at 1389-91 (comparing the current CDO market to earlier junk bond markets that
collapsed due to risky investments made by portfolio managers in return for high yield returns).
90 See Michael A. Levine, Managing Legal Risks through CSR in Light ofRecent Alien Tort Statute
Decisions, 39.1 ABA INT'L L. NEWS 15, 19 (2010), availableat http://www.ebglaw.com/files/37574_
LevineREPRINT-rev.pdf (noting that "CSR programs may serve to mitigate those [litigation] risks");
see also Branson, supra note 12, at 1225-26 (discussing the new corporate social movement, and the
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social responsibility and business profitability are not mutually exclusive,
and can benefit financial institutions.
II. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY & CORPORATE LAW

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is a broad concept describing a
business's obligation to interact with society in a socially responsible
manner. 9 1 The legal debate over CSR has evolved from a much-criticized
effort to hold corporate managers accountable to stakeholders other than
shareholders, and from a more nuanced discussion of the realities of CSR
in a global economy, including its limits in holding management
accountable for societal harms. 92
The early debates on corporate social responsibility have been attributed
to Adolf A. Berle and E. Merrick Dodd.93 These scholars debated the duties
of directors and the role of corporations in society. 94 Over the years, the
debate over whether a corporation is private, public, or quasi-public
property has continued, with its popularity often tied to the public social or
economic issues of the time. 95
Much like the current climate, in which anger over the conduct of Wall
Street financial firms has energized a movement against perceived greed
and excessiveness, CSR was reinvigorated during the 1970s as many
potential benefits it could have); David Hess, Social Reporting: A Reflexive Law Approach to
Corporate Social Responsiveness, 25 J. CORP. L. 41, 81-82 (1999) ("[A] social report promotes
improved and informed corporate decision-making .... A social report creates higher-quality decisions
by providing managers with the information necessary to understand the full impact of any corporate
action.").
91

See DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE: THE POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF CORPORATE

SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 2 (2005) (interpreting corporate social responsibility as "practices that improve
the workplace and benefit society in ways that go above and beyond what companies are legally
required to do"); see also WILLIAM B. WERTHER, JR. & DAVID CHANDLER, STRATEGIC CORPORATE
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: STAKEHOLDERS IN A GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 5 (SAGE PUBL'NS INC. 2006)

(1969) (teaching that "CSR covers the relationship between corporations (or other large organizations)
and the societies with which they interact"); Williams, supra note 13, at 711 (discussing the three basic
positions discussed in corporate social responsibility literature: the "irresponsible" position, the
"predominant" position, and the "progressive" position).
92 See Williams, supra note 13, at 715-17, 720-21 (highlighting competing views on corporate
social responsibility, as well as a brief overview of transnational economic activity in the globalizing
economy); see also C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of CorporateSocial Responsibility: An Historical
Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77, 82-88 (2002) (discussing the
existence of a debate about the role of corporations in modem society); see, e.g., Peter Nobel, Social
Responsibility of Corporations, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1255, 1262 (1999) (exploring Germany's codetermination legislation, "which contains clear 'social' aspects and, if implemented, would affect
European Union corporate law and takeover proposals").
93 See Wells, supranote 92, at 82-96 (discussing Berle, Dodd, and the origins of the debate).
94 Id. (laying the historical context for legal debates over corporate social responsibility).
95 See id. (exploring the changing framework for the CSR debate from the 1920s to the early
1990s).
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argued that corporations had attained too much power in society, thus
warranting government intervention to curtail corporate power and make
firms more accountable to society. 96 A variety of efforts to increase
corporate social responsibility emerged, including shareholder voting,
proxy requirements, independent directors (public interest directors), and
disclosure and accounting of corporate social responsibility. 97
Notwithstanding the ebb and flow of proponents of corporate social
responsibility to seek greater accountability of corporations for societal
harm, the ultimately predominant view of corporate social responsibility is
the shareholder-centered model, in which managers manage the corporation
for the benefit of shareholders and have a primary duty to maximize
shareholder wealth. 98
International and U.S. corporate laws make it difficult to enforce CSR by
means other than guidelines and market forces. 99 Corporate law, through
the enforcement of director fiduciary duties, requires management to act in
the best interest of the corporation and its shareholders.oo While corporate
law gives directors some latitude to consider the interests of stakeholders
other than shareholders, such consideration is limited; shareholders'
interests take priority.101 Nevertheless, corporate law in general, as well as
the lawyers that advise corporate management, encourages careful
consideration of the concerns of other constituents. 102 Thus, CSR is subject
not only to the legal requirements applicable to corporate fiduciaries, but
96 See Branson, supra note 12, at 1211-12 (noting activists' concerns that corporations had grown
so large, and affected so many, that they should be regarded as public or quasi-public institutions, and
regulated as such).
97 See id. at 1211-15 (discussing the corporate social movement and proposals).
98 See Williams, supra note 13, at 712-15 (explaining, in addition, that the interests of other
corporate stakeholders should be protected by methods other than participation in corporate
governance).
99 See id. at 724 (discussing the limits of laws); see also Wells, supra note 92, at 123-24
(explaining how Milton Friedman believed that replacing market mechanisms with political
mechanisms when determining how resources should be allocated was inefficient and immoral). See
generally Charlotte Villiers, CorporateLaw, CorporatePower and CorporateSocial Responsibility, in
PERSPECTIVES ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 85, 100 (Nina Boeger et al. eds., 2008) (noting
the global challenge to corporate social responsibility).
100 See Williams, supra note 13, at 715 (discussing the "irresponsible" position); see also Janet E.
Kerr, The Creative CapitalismSpectrum: Evaluating CorporateSocial Responsibility Through a Legal
Lens, 81 TEMP. L. REv. 831, 835 (2008) (explaining director liability).
101 See Wells, supra note 92, at 126-27 (noting the onset of corporate constituency statutes in the
1980s); see also Nobel, supra note 92, at 1260 (discussing what directors are allowed to do, and the
consensus that "a corporation must consider the interests of all stakeholders (and not simply
shareholders)").
102 See Wells, supra note 92, at 126-27 (discussing anti-takeover defenses and corporate
constituency statutes); see also Nobel, supra note 92, at 1260 (clarifying what directors are allowed to
do, and how under a long-term view, even profit maximizing might demand that a corporation consider
an optimal combination of all contributing factors).
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also the requirement of promoting corporate profit-making - sometimes at
the expense of socially desirable goals.10 3
A. CorporateSocial Responsibility & Business Strategy
In the U.S and internationally, CSR is now recognized as a part of
overall corporate business strategy, as evidenced by the many organizations
and companies touting CSR as an appropriate business model, the
increased number of consultants advising businesses on the appropriate
CSR focus, and the number of companies advertising CSR initiatives. 10 4
Business leaders have embraced CSR as a moral imperative because
corporations have significant economic and political power in society.os
Firms are expected to utilize corporate powers in a socially responsible
way.106 The basic assumption of CSR is that a corporation is obligated not
only to recognize its effects on society, but to work towards reducing any
negative impact of corporate activities.10 7
Thus, despite the law's constraints on CSR, corporate social
responsibility is embraced by prestigious U.S. and international
The United Nations identifies several standards for
organizations.
CSR efforts.l 08 Other international organizations
a
corporation's
assessing
also have identified CSR as a key to the success of multinational
corporations in the increasingly global economy. 109
103 See Williams, supra note 13, at 724-25 (noting the limiting nature of a corporation's
organizational design in effectively translating legal requirements into actions at all levels of the
organization).
104 See Villiers, supra note 99, at 89 (highlighting the CSR consulting businesses and the six
categories of CSR initiatives: "international instruments, nationally based standards, certifications
schemes, voluntary initiatives, mainstream financial indices, and tools, meetings and other initiatives");
see also Bryan Horrigan, Fault Lines in The Intersection Between Corporate Governance and Social
Responsibility, 25 U. N.S.W. L.J. 515, 518 (2002) (arguing that the corporate mindset is changing to
decision-making based on a wider set of integrated interests such as "ecological integrity, effective
decision-making, and social cohesion").
105 See Horrigan,supra note 104, at 518-21 (discussing global and ideological debates); see also
Villiers, supra note 99, at 88 (emphasizing how much power corporations have, including the ability to
"crush a local economy" and "provide a living or not for individuals").
106 See Villiers, supranote 99, at 88 (stating that the connection between power and responsibility
shows that corporate power naturally demands a form of corporate responsibility).
107 See id. at 85 (setting forth CSR advocates' assertion "that corporations are to be made
accountable for their activities and for how they exercise their power and that CSR should lead to
corporations having a positive effect on society and the environment").
108 See id at 89 (noting that there are 200 such standards and initiatives).
109 See id. (discussing a UN report which makes clear "that the existence of so many initiatives
reflects a recognition on the part of a broad range of actors that corporate activity must be monitored
and controlled in order to protect society and the environment"); see also VOGEL, supra note 91, at 6-8
(exploring the resurgence of corporate social responsibility, its growing reach, and how organizations
such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development "actively promote CSR").
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In the U.S., many companies embrace CSR in order to obtain positive
corporate rankings. For example, some U.S. companies obtain rankings of
their CSR efforts through the Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes (DJSI) and
promote positive DJSI rankings as part of a CSR strategy.110 Other firms
also seek rankings for their CSR efforts through prestigious certifications
by international agencies."ll Notwithstanding the increased focus on
corporate social responsibility, its effectiveness in improving corporate
governance has been limited.112
Much of the difficulty in achieving greater acceptance of CSR by
businesses is based on the fact that there is no agreement on the meaning of
CSR.113 The limits of CSR in improving corporate governance are
attributable not only to the legal boundaries of corporate law, but also to a
lack of a concise meaning of what constitutes corporate social
responsibility.114
The meaning of CSR suffers from a definition that is too broad and
vague to be successfilly implemented by businesses.11 5 The result is that
companies are often not clear on what is expected of them to achieve good
CSR.116 CSR means different things to different companies, industries, and
countries, and it becomes whatever a corporation defines as its efforts to be
socially responsible.11 7 Corporations are thus left to select CSR agendas
ranging from the elimination of poverty to the creation of environmentallysustainable products.118 Corporations use CSR to promote human rights
initiatives, environmental and sustainability programs, diversity and other

110 See Dow Jones Sustainability Index, http://www.sustainability-index.com (last visited on June
26, 2010) (indicating that the DJSI are "the first global indexes tracking the financial performance of
the leading sustainability-driven companies worldwide"); see also Kerr, supra note 100, at 864 (listing
the main business benefits to an organization of having a defined corporate responsibility policy).
I11 See Villiers, supra note 99, at 89 (surveying existing CSR initiatives).
112 See id. (discussing the limits of CSR); see also Williams, supra note 13, at 724-25 (suggesting
that "constraints are insufficient fully to address the concerns of corporate social responsibility in the
context of a globalizing economy").
113 See Villiers, supra note 99, at 91 (discussing how the CSR definition is problematic, and how
the problem is further exacerbated in a globalized context).
114 See id. (stating that the voluntariness of CSR allows companies to "set their own CSR agenda
without fear of significant challenge").
115 See id (explaining how "the same term ... may carry different implications among various
parties regarding the legitimacy, obligations and impact of corporate social responsibility standards").
116 See id. at 90 (stating that "[c]ompanies are left confused as to what is expected of them").
117 See id. at 91 (noting that a major weakness in the CSR agenda is that the voluntary approach
apparent in most definitions gives companies the power to set their own CSR agendas without fear of
significant challenge).
118 See id. (asserting that such agendas can be established without challenge); see also Michael E.
Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Strategy & Society: The Link Between Competitive Advantage and
CorporateSocial Responsibility, 84 HARV. Bus. REv. 78, 81 (2006) (claiming that this often results in a
"hodgepodge of uncoordinated CSR").
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workplace improvement efforts, philanthropic contributions, and
community outreach programs."l 9 What seems consistent among the
various definitions of CSR is that companies must conduct business in a
way that satisfies minimal legal requirements and identifies social or
economic issues that are sustainable for long-term profit.120
Shareholders and consumers are increasingly looking at a variety of
indexes to measure a corporation's corporate social responsibility.121 In
addition, a variety of industry consultants are advising corporations on how
to design CSR plans.122 There are also many international efforts to define
CSR, including a United Nations Report identifying a range of standards
for measuring corporate social responsibility.123 These standards include
national assessments and certifications, as well as various voluntary
initiatives, such as codes of conduct and other published policies and
directives focused on corporate efforts to improve society and the
environment.124
Over the years, various other organizations have also attempted to define
CSR. In 1981, The Business Roundtable released a statement on corporate
social responsibility:
Balancing the shareholder's expectations of maximum return against
other priorities is one of the fundamental problems confronting
corporate management. The shareholder must receive a good return
but the legitimate concerns of other constituencies (customers,
employees, communities, suppliers and society at large) also must
have the appropriate attention .. . [Leading managers] believe that by
giving enlightened consideration to balancing the legitimate claims of
all its constituents, a corporation will best serve the interest of its
shareholders.1 25

119 See Villiers, supra note 99, at 89 (listing examples of such "good corporate deeds").
120 See id. at 92 (stating that corporations should operate "in a manner that at least meets legal
requirements and that respects social and economic interests so that economic progress is sustainable
rather than merely short-term").
121 See Shane M. Shelley, Entrenched Managers & CorporateSocial Responsibility, 111 PENN ST.
L. REV. 107, 118-19 (2006) (discussing the various providers of such indexes).
122 See Villiers, supra note 99, at 89 ("There exists a large CSR industry and consultants,
accountants, lawyers and others will advise companies on how to direct their CSR strategies and how to
present them).
123 See Villiers, supra note 99, at 89 (providing a brief synopsis of the UN report).
124 See id. (listing the six categories of the standards and initiatives relevant to corporate social
responsibility).
125 Henry Mintzberg, Robert Simons & Kunal Basu, Beyond Selfishness, 44.1 MIT SLOAN
MGMT. REV. 67, 69 (2002) (quoting Business Roundtable, Statement on Corporate Responsibility 9
(October 1981)) available at http://sloanreview.mit.edu/the-magazine/articles/2002/fall/4417/beyondselfishness/#ref4.
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The World Business Council on Sustainable Development defines CSR
as "the commitment of business to contribute to sustainable economic
development, working with employees, their families, the local community
and society at large to improve their quality of life."l 26 The Business for
Social Responsibility states:
While there is no single, commonly accepted definition of... CSR,
it generally refers to business decision-making linked to ethical
values, compliance with legal instruments, and respect for people,
communities and the environment ... [and] operating a business in
a manner that meets or exceeds the ethical, legal, commercial and
public expectations that society has of business.127
Finally, the Working Group of the ISO noted that a commonality of CSR
definitions "revolve[s] around the concept of the 'triple-bottom line' . . .
which is a framework for measuring and reporting corporate performance
against economic, social and environmental parameters." 28
Notwithstanding the efforts of international organizations to define CSR
agendas and promote CSR as part of business decision-making, there are
no broad patterns of corporations adopting CSR strategies in order to
improve corporate behavior.129 CSR's effect on improving corporate
governance will not be perceived until management is required to identify
the link between profit-making and society's economic viability, and, in
turn, develop products designed to improve both.130 "Too big to fail"
financial institutions must operate with a concise definition of CSR in
which compliance is mandatory.

III. CSR AND "Too BIG TO FAIL" FINANCIAL FIRMS - A MEANINGFUL
DEFINITION

For financial firms deemed "too big to fail" by the federal government, a
few fundamental concepts of corporate social responsibility require

126 Villiers, supra note 99, at 92 (quoting The Desirability and Feasibility of ISO Corporate Social
Responsibility Standards, COPOLCO 16/2002 (COPOLCO May 2002) (final report)).
127 Id. (alteration to original).
128 Id. at 93 (alteration to original); see Porter, supra note 118, at 82 (setting forth the elements of
triple bottom lines and problems implementing them); see also Horrigan, supra note 104, at 518-19
(discussing the "'quadruple bottom line' emphasis for companies [which] focuses on the dynamic
interaction between components which cover financial, socioeconomic, and environmental concerns, as
well as governance and regulatory concerns").
129 See Villiers, supra note 99, at 89 (noting the public outcry for CSR initiatives).
130 See Porter,supranote 118, at 83-84 (discussing integration of business and society).
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adjusting. Furthermore, a definition of CSR is needed under which
philanthropic initiatives are required and CSR is mandatory for "too big to
fail" financial firms. 13 1
The recent financial crisis has demonstrated that systemic risks are posed
to the capital markets when financial firms sell products that fuel
economic instability and inflict negative social consequences. The subprime mortgages sold in communities, the process of securitization (and its
corresponding moral hazard dilemma), and, ultimately, the global
economic recession are directly linked to the business decisions of financial
firms on Wall Street.
By designating financial firms as "too big to fail," the federal
government has implicitly acknowledged that certain financial institutions
produce products that are so interwoven into society's economic stability
that their collapse must be either prevented or managed in order to limit the
negative consequences to financial markets and the economy. As a result
of the federal government's intervention to stabilize financial markets for
certain institutions, the call for improved corporate social responsibility for
these institutions differs from previous movements to push a corporate
social responsibility agenda.132 Because "too big to fail" financial firms
have the economic power to influence society, such firms must be obliged
to minimize harm to it.
By requiring "too big to fail" institutions to engage in CSR strategies, the
federal government would communicate an overarching policy that
embraces CSR as not only the morally responsible thing to do, but also the
right business decision. It is critical that corporations be required to
include a corporate social responsibility agenda in their corporate
governance; and one under which such corporations will consider the risks
of financial products on communities. 133 Financial firms important to the
flow of capital should be required to assess the future economic
consequences of the mortgaged-based products they sell in the
communities they serve. Financial firms that are deemed vital to the
stability of the U.S. economy and that require government funding in the
event of financial instability should be required to know the effects of their
131 See Kerr, supra note 100, at 848-55 (arguing that CSR needs a better definition, and what the
definition should contain).
132 See Branson, supra note 12, at 1217 (exploring the "new corporate social responsibility
movement," and how it differs from previous CRS movements).
133 See Horrigan, supra note 104, at 521-28 (emphasizing the importance of linking
socioeconomic interests to corporate governance, because "[n]either organisations nor individuals are
likely to take corporate social responsibility seriously as part of their core business unless it is
effectively integrated within corporate governance").
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financial products (which are derived from consumer mortgages) on
communities.
Generally, it is argued that there are four justifications for businesses to
engage
in
CSR.134
They
include
moral
obligation,
sustainability/environment, license to operate, and reputation.13 5 Such
justifications, however, are criticized as being weak, on the grounds that
they are generic strategies that do little to assist a company in identifying
and prioritizing major social issues. 136 A more persuasive argument in
support of firms' implementation of CSR strategies is rooted in the
interrelationship between corporations and society.1 37 Financial firms and
other businesses need society to have stable economic conditions in which
to sell goods and services, while society needs such companies to prosper
in order to provide economic well-being for its citizens. Thus, "too big to
fail" financial institutions must embrace CSR strategies that identify the
point where business and societal needs intersect. 138 The current collapse
of the mortgaged-backed securities market fueled by subprime mortgages
highlights this intersection of business and societal interests.
Due to the increasing popularity of CSR strategies as a point of firm
differentiation, many financial firms have CSR statements. 139 Yet, these
CSR strategies do little more than identify a moral checklist on corporate
philanthropy.14 0 A CSR strategy can and should be more. For CSR to be
accepted by boards and management as a profitable way to do business, it
must be responsive to business and societal needs. As one scholar writes,
CSR must unlock "shared value by investing in social aspects of context
134 Porter, supranote 118, at 81 (outlining the four justifications).
135 Id at 81-83 (defining moral obligation as companies having "a duty to be good citizens and to
'do the right thing;"' sustainability as emphasizing "environmental and community stewardship;"
license to operate as deriving "from the fact that every company needs tacit or explicit permission from
governments, communities, and numerous other stakeholders to do business;" and reputation as being
used "by many companies to justify CSR initiatives on the grounds that they will improve a company's
image, strengthen its brand, enliven morale, and even raise the value of its stock").
136 See id. at 83 (finding that most of the CSR strategies make no meaningful impact).
137 See Horrigan,supra note 104, at 521-28 (discussing the important connection between social
responsibility and corporate governance).
138 See Porter, supra note 118, at 83-84. There are two forms of intersection. Inside-out linkages
are when "a company impinges upon society through its operations in the normal course of business,"
while outside-in linkages are when external social conditions influence corporations. Id. at 84.
139 See id. at 81 (noting that 64% of the 250 largest multinational corporations published CSR
reports in 2005); see also supra note 14 and accompanying text.
140 See Sarah A. Altschuller, Distinctions with Diferences: The Lawyer's Role in Distinguishing
CSR and Corporate Philanthropy, 39 INT'L L. NEWS 11 (2010) (stating that CSR and corporate
philanthropy - which contain many differences that lawyers should advise clients about - "are often
used interchangeably in the popular media and in business publications: most frequently, specific
instances of corporate philanthropy are deemed to be representative of a company's commitment to
CSR").
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that strengthen company competitiveness.
A symbiotic relationship
develops: The success of the company and the success of the community
become mutually reinforcing."'41 By integrating business and societal
needs, companies are better able to identify social needs and prioritize them
based on their importance to business operations.142 A strategically focused
CSR allows financial firms to integrate business needs with societal
needs.143
"Too big to fail" financial institutions should continue to let market
forces generate product ideas and develop creative business solutions to
meet market voids. However, each product must not only demonstrate its
profitability for the firm and the individual, but management must also
judge the product's success by how much it lessens harmful consequences
to communities. Good corporate governance requires the board of a "too
big to fail" financial institution to identify and consider factors such as
societal and individual moral hazards, concentrations of products in lowincome communities, and the potential negative effects of such products.
Such governance will arm the board with improved decision-making tools,
which, in turn, will allow it to better predict any potential harmful
consequences.
Boards and management informed by CSR data on its financial products
must then be required to address product issues and report any possible
harmful consequences to regulators and shareholders. If CSR is not a zerosum game, then management's efforts to embrace a multi-dimensional
bottom line can provide greater transparency to shareholders and promote
improved corporate governance.
In order to effect changes in management behavior, CSR must be
mandatory and monitored by regulatory bodies responsible for systemic
risk assessment. To be successful, CSR must implement ways "to find
shared value in operating practices and in the social dimensions of
[G]overnments and companies must stop
competitive context ....
thinking in terms of 'corporate social responsibility' and start thinking in
terms of 'corporate social integration."' 144 Thus, the definition of
corporate social responsibility applicable to financial institutions deemed
141 Porter, supra note I18, at 89.
142 See id. at 91 (explaining how organizations will distance themselves from the pack when they
make the right choices and build focused, proactive, and integrated social initiatives in concert with
their core strategies).
143 See id (emphasizing that "[w]hat needs to be measured is social impact"); see also Horrigan,
supra note 104, at 548 (finding that the best interests of a corporation and its shareholders need not be
exclusively framed in financial or continuous profit-maximization terms).
144 Porter, supra note 118, at 92.
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"too big to fail" by the federal government focuses only on those
institutions posing a systemic risk to the financial system. Such a
definition is a reasonable solution to the problems posed by overly broad
and unworkable definitions facing other businesses in other industries.145
In addition to its definitional challenges, CSR is also limited by the fact
that most corporate CSR activities are currently voluntary.14 6 Voluntary
CSR compliance is said to promote best practices by allowing companies to
design CSR programs that meet specific business or industry needs and
permitting market forces to set standards.14 7 Critics of voluntary CSR argue
that without enforcement, CSR will continue to be taken seriously by only
a handful of companies.1 48 Moreover, critics of voluntary CSR point out
that:
[V]oluntary approaches are generally implemented, not out of
altruism, but in response to consumer and community pressures,
industry peer pressure, competitive pressures or the threat of new
[T]he danger is that reliance on
regulations or taxes ....
business arguments leads to debate based on costs/benefits rather
than on moral rights and wrongs so further emphasizing ad hoc
coverage and undermines the moral force of arguments so
eventually weakens the threat to reputation.149
Others suggest that by separating CSR from competitive advantages,
companies simply miss the opportunity to separate the moral imperative
from the business case for CSR, thus weakening its use strategically to
improve business goals.15 0
A. Voluntary versus Mandatory CSR
Without mandatory CSR requirements set by the federal government,
"too big to fail" financial firms will continue to rely on rankings and a
moral checklist for CSR compliance. Mandatory CSR is necessary in order

145 See id. at 91 (stating that Whole Foods, Sysco, and General Electric have been exposed to
criticism and government regulation).
146 See id. at 80-81 (noting that companies awoke to corporate responsibility after the public
responded to certain corporate practices).
147 See Villiers, supra note 99, at 96 (stating that the voluntary approach encourages best practice
and continual improvement through codes that have the flexibility to be tailored to the characteristics
and circumstances of each business).
148 See id at 97 (noting that "despite the perceived benefits of . . . voluntary initiatives, the
evidence suggests that, in reality, CSR has hardly moved [past its] starting point").
149 Id at 98 (alteration to original).
150 See Porter, supranote 118, at 91 (finding that companies should envision creating shared value
as a long-term investment in the company's future competitiveness).
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to evince the seriousness of such institutions' failure to financial markets.
Mandatory CSR is also needed so that less reliance is placed on voluntary
compliance. More importantly, mandatory CSR recognizes the role of
government and financial firms in achieving regulatory objectives to
provide stability to financial markets in times of crisis.151
Mandatory CSR also improves disclosure of the CSR efforts of all
financial institutions, 152 as well as the dialogue of management by
broadening its scope to focus not only on product profitability for the firm,
but also the firm's effect on society and communities. Requiring disclosure
of firms' CSR efforts not only improves transparency, but also allows the
government to better assess and prevent financial market systemic risks,
since the government has the relevant data.153 The new regulatory regime
brought about by the financial crisis offers the best opportunity for
imposing stricter corporate social responsibility requirements on financial
firms.
B. A New Regulatory Environmentfor FinancialFirms (Investment Banks)
Investment banks, through their purchase and sale of securitized debt,
are viewed as key impetus leading to the financial meltdown. 154 The
financial crisis has led to bankruptcy as well as institutional changes in the
way investment banks are regulated and in the regulatory structure of
financial firms.155
151 See Villiers, supra note 99, at 99 (cautioning that "the emphasis on voluntarism risks
understating or marginalizing the law's role, rendering it as seemingly irrelevant").
152 See Michael R. Siebecker, Trust & Transparency:Promoting Efficient CorporateDisclosure
Through Fiduciary-BasedDiscourse, 87 WASH. U. L.R. 115, 121-23 (2009) ("While steadfast reliance
on static disclosure standards would undermine efficiency despite providing predictability, a common
law duty of disclosure based on encapsulated trust would provide flexible standards for corporate
communication that evolve as market preferences change. In the end . . . encapsulated trust ... could
lead to enhanced ethical practices by corporate actors and their counsel.").
153 See Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social
Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1200-03 (1999) (discussing whether the SEC has the power to
require social as well as financial disclosure, and how social disclosure would promote "'social
transparency' in the capital markets comparable to the financial transparency that [already] exists").
154 See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin & Vikas Bajaj, Shift for Goldman and Morgan Marks the End of
an Era, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/22/business/22bank
,html? r-2&[agewamted=print (explaining why Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley are becoming
bank holding companies).
155 See Tami Luhby, New World on Wall Street, CNN MONEY, Sept. 22, 2008, available at
the
(discussing
http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/2 1/news/companies/goldman morgan/index.htm
regulatory changes to some financial firms); see also Dwight Jaffee & Mark Perlow, Investment
Banking Regulation After Bear Stearns, 5 ECON. VOICE 1 (2008), available at www.bepress.com/
ev/vol5/iss5/artl (exploring what investment banking legislation will be like after the Bear Steams
collapse); Sorkin, supra note 153 (discussing the greater regulation Goldman Sachs and Morgan
Stanley will experience as bank holding companies); Robert Schroeder, Goldman, Morgan to Become
Holding Companies, MARKET WATCH, Sept. 21, 2008, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/story/print?
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The Federal Reserve now has regulatory authority over traditional banks
and investment banks. 156 Upon the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the
remaining traditional investment banks either converted to bank holding
companies or merged with other financial institutions. 157 Prior to the
financial crisis, banks such as Wells Fargo and Citibank were subject to
regulatory review by the Federal Reserve.1 58 Traditional investment banks
such as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley were subject to regulatory
review by the SEC.159 The SEC's regulatory oversight of investment banks
did not include an assessment of capital structures or debt levels.160 Since
the financial crisis, the two remaining investment banks that were not
purchased or already owned by a traditional bank voluntarily converted to
bank holding companies subject to the regulatory review of the Federal
Reserve. 161
guid=CB7220 IA-A795-4C78-8F68-E64DAA26398D (addressing Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley
becoming bank holding companies); Greg Sushinsky, The Changing Face of Investment Banking: The
Opportunities in Rebuilding Wall Street, EQUITIES MAG., available at http://www.nasdaq.com/news
content/20100107/TheChanging Face ofInvestmentBankingTheOpportunities in Rebuilding W
all Street.aspx?storyid=2010010718271 1EQUIT (stating that the "aftermath from the fall of Lehman
Brothers and the earlier troubles of Bear Steams in 2008 resulted in dramatic changes to the investment
banks on Wall Street").
156 See Sorkin, supra note 153 (quoting Loyde C. Blankfein, who was the Chairman and Chief
Executive of Goldman Sachs, as saying "[w]e believe that Goldman Sachs, under Federal Reserve
supervision, will be regarded as an even more secure institution with an exceptionally clean balance
sheet and a greater diversity of funding sources"); see also Schroeder, supra note 154 (setting forth
Blankfein's statement that "[w]hile accelerated by market sentiment, our decision to be regulated by the
Federal Reserve is based on the recognition that such regulation provides its members with full
prudential supervision and access to permanent liquidity and funding"); Sushinsky, supra note 155
("Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley are now bank-holding companies, and along with the advantages
of being able to ease investors' concerns about capital, they are also now subject to oversight from the
Federal Reserve.").
157 See Sorkin, supra note 153 ("Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, the last big independent
investment banks on Wall Street, will transform themselves into bank holding companies . . . .
JPMorgan Chase acquired Bear Steams this spring in a fire sale brokered by the federal government,
while Bank of America has agreed to buy Merrill Lynch for $50 billion."); see also Schroeder, supra
note 154 ("The Fed's move is the latest milestone in a jaw-dropping couple of weeks for Wall Street
and American business. Goldman and Morgan were the last two independent investment banks,
following the filing for bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the acquiring of Bear Stearns by JP Morgan
this spring. Bank of America, meanwhile, is buying Merrill Lynch."); Roddy Boyd, The Last Days of
Bear Stearns, CNN MONEY, March 31, 2008, available at http://money.cnn.com/2008/03/28/magazines
/fortune/boyd bear.fortuneindex.htm (giving a brief synopsis of JPMorgan Chase's acquisition of Bear
Stearns).
158 See FEDERAL RESERVE, PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 59-60 (2005), http://www.federalreserve.gov/
pf/pdf/pfcomplete.pdf (discussing the regulatory functions of the Federal Reserve).
159 See The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and
Facilitates Capital Formation, SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/about/
whatwedo.shtml ("The SEC oversees the key participants in the securities world, including securities
exchanges, securities brokers and dealers, investment advisors, and mutual funds.").
160 See id. (listing the main purposes behind Congress's establishment of the SEC in 1934).
161 See Sorkin, supra note 153 (discussing the greater regulations that new bank holding companies
will be subject to); see also Schroeder, supra note 154 (explaining the costs and benefits to Goldman
Sachs and Morgan Stanley of becoming holding companies, which are subject to stricter federal
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The move to become bank holding companies is an acknowledgment by
investment banks that a lack of regulatory oversight places these firms at
greater financial risk.162 A lack of regulatory oversight and capital
requirements has allowed traditional investment banks to take on too much
leverage and engage in risky bets on financial products derived from
consumer mortgages.1 63
With a new regulatory landscape, traditional banks, their investment
bank subsidiaries, and stand alone investment banks are now subject to new
regulatory standards.164 In addition to new capital and disclosure
obligations, the financial markets will have greater transparency into the
types of financial instruments sold by banks (through their investment bank
subsidiaries) and investment banks.165 Recent congressional efforts to
further regulate financial firms mark the opportunity for banks and
investment banks to reengage their CSR strategies in meaningful ways.
Financial firms can identify and correct the moral hazards of their financial
products by understanding the effect of consumer-based financial products
on society.
In order to establish the overall safety and soundness of financial
institutions, banks have traditionally disclosed a range of financial data to
regulators.166 The new regulatory regime affords "too big to fail"
institutions the opportunity to develop improved financial data, which links
the products sold to communities and improves the long-term profitability
oversight).
162 See Sorkin, supra note 153 (quoting John J. Mack, who was the Chairman and Chief Executive
of Morgan Stanley, as saying that "[t]his new bank holding structure will ensure that Morgan Stanley is
in the strongest possible position - with the stability and flexibility to seize opportunities in the rapidly
changing financial marketplace"); see also Schroeder, supra note 1554 (setting forth Goldman Sachs's
Blankfein's statement that "[w]e believe that Goldman Sachs, under Federal Reserve supervision, will
be regarded as an even more secure institution with an exceptionally clean balance sheet and a greater
diversity of funding sources"); MORRIS, supra note 3, at 50-51 (inferring the increased financial risk
associated with the previous investment schemes, which required little or no collateral).
163 See Sorkin, supra note 153 ("For decades, firms like Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs
thrived by taking bold bets with their own money, often using enormous amounts of debt to increase
their profits, with little outside oversight."); see also Schroeder, supra note 154 (noting the movement
of the last two independent investment banks toward higher regulation, resulting in a speculative
increase in the security of those institutions); MORRIS, supra note 3, at 50-51 (explaining how these
firms competed to provide leverage loans on extraordinarily generous terms and demanded limited
information on loan specifics).
164 See FEDERAL RESERVE, REGULATIONS, http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/reglisting
.htm (highlighting the regulation under the Federal Reserve); see also Jaffee, supra note 154, at 3-4
(explaining the current investment banking regulation and what it should look like in the future).
165 See FEDERAL RESERVE, supra note 164 (listing all the federal regulations); see also supra note
11 (discussing the passing of a Senate bill that broadly expanded the federal oversight of the financial
sector).
166 See FEDERAL RESERVE, FINANCIAL STATEMENT, http://www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/
Categorylndex.cfm?WhichCategory=1 (listing the extensive financial statements required by the
Federal Reserve).
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of financial firms, while at the same time demonstrating that the right CSR
strategy can both increase profits and minimize the harm to society. The
time is right, as financial firms have acknowledged the inseparable
connection between financial products derived from consumer mortgages
and the harm to communities and broader society. Also, the current
regulatory environment affords financial firms the opportunity to take on a
leadership role in designing strategies that embrace sound financial
decisions focused on long-term growth.
Wall Street and Main Street are not parallel lines, but rather are
connected paths intersecting at critical junctures in the economy. The new
climate of regulatory reform makes it the right time for financial
institutions to develop CSR practices that bring meaningful changes to the
way financial firms interact with the communities they serve.
In order to assist financial firms in designing CSR initiatives that are
more meaningful than a moral checklist, a precise definition of CSR is
needed in order to avoid the lack of cohesion faced by many companies in
defining its CSR efforts. A CSR definition for "too big to fail" financial
firms must go beyond broad descriptors for ethical conduct, philanthropic
efforts, or environmental initiatives. The proper definition must identify
the connection between profitability and societal needs. 167 CSR can offer
opportunities for financial firms deemed "too big to fail" to reconcile their
financial products with potential effects on society. In particular, an
optimal CSR strategy would link the interdependence of corporate goals
and societal needs in ways that demonstrate the consequences of failed
business decisions on communities. 168 Mandatory compliance is necessary
to hold financial firms accountable. Corporate social responsibility must be
disclosed to shareholders and investors.
C. Disclosuresand SEC Enforcement

Financial firms should engage in mandatory reporting that requires a
corporation to understand how its products and policies impact not only it
shareholders, but its societal stakeholders as well.169 Thus, a question
167 See Porter, supranote 11818, at 91 (suggesting a model of corporate organization that supports
corporate social responsibility).
168 See Rosabeth Moss Kanter, From Spare Change to Real Change: The Social Sector as Beta
Site for Business Innovation, in 77 HARV. Bus. REV. 122, 124 (1999) (discussing how companies have
"learned that applying their energies to solving the chronic problems of the social sector powerfully
stimulates their own business development").
169 See Hess, supra note 90, at 47 (discussing social reporting and how its use in regulating
corporate social responsibility would permit meaningful public scrutiny); see also Siebecker, supra note
152, at 121-23 (examining the shareholder interest in corporate social responsibility).
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emerges: what information should "too big to fail" financial firms be
required to disclose to satisfy their corporate social responsibilities?
D. Disclosures

Mandatory disclosures should require social accounting and reporting.170
Social audits and reports require a firm to evaluate the societal impact of its
decisions on stakeholders and others. 17 1 Social reporting involves more
than mere disclosure of a code of ethics; it includes an assessment of a
firm's social performance and how the firm makes responsible corporate
governance decisions.172
The need for the federal government to regulate "too big to fail"
financial firms presents the appropriate opportunity to legislate corporate
social reporting.173 Business leaders embrace corporate social
responsibility as the right thing to do, yet find it difficult to determine the
best approach to pursue profits while still achieving socially responsible
objectives.1 74 When defining corporate social responsibility for financial
firms as requiring such firms to directly link products to societal impact,
financial firms must understand social responsibility and be responsive to
it.175 Thus, in order to analyze what is socially responsible, a financial firm
must gather information so it can determine social consequences, and then
develop a decision-making process that management must reflect on before
acting.' 7 6 Once a financial firm has implemented a corporate decisionmaking process that identifies social consequences, management must be
responsive to the social issues identified.177
The financial firm must respond to social issues in much the same way it
identifies the needs of stakeholders (including shareholders) when making

170 See Hess, supra note 90, at 43 ("To control corporate behavior, the necessary ... approach is
social accounting, auditing, and reporting . . .").
171 See id ("Stakeholders include all individuals and groups who are affected by, or can affect, the
organization."); see also Larry E. Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility In Corporate
Governance, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1431, 1466 (2006) (discussing current accountability methods).
172 See Hess, supra note 90, at 43 (noting that "a social report is similar to a corporate financial
audit, but concerns a company's social performance").
173 See id at 47 (identifying factors to consider when determining the appropriate time to
implement corporate social reporting).
174 See Hess, supra note 90, at 51-52 ("[W]hat does it mean to be 'socially responsible'? Scholars
studying this question have found that the idea of social responsibility can be understood best if divided
into two distinct concepts: corporate social responsibility and corporate social responsiveness.").
175 See id. at 51-55 (discussing CSR and responsiveness).
176 See id at 53 (outlining the decision process that corporations should go through before acting).
177 See id. (claiming that for a corporation to be responsible, it must act as a responsible person
would).

480

JOURNALOFCIVIL RIGH7S& ECONOMCDEVELOPMENT

[Vol.25:3

business decisions.178 Corporate social responsibility must be a part of
governance and the matrix of issues that financial firms consider when
designing financial products.1 79 Such a decision-making process involves
more than just assigning a moral value judgment about what is the right
thing to do; the process comprises the financial firm's understanding of the
connection between the financial products sold and the potential broader
economic risks. The firm implements a process to understand internal and
external product risks.80
Framing corporate social responsibility as reflexive law, Professor Hess
maintains that, in addition to mandatory reporting, social reporting must
require internal procedures and policies that are regularly updated and
define specific stakeholders and goals.181 Corporate social reports must
also be subject to verification by external auditors182 and publicly
disclosed.183
E. Disclosure andSEC Enforcement
Mandatory disclosure of corporate social responsiveness and reporting
could be accomplished under the current reporting requirements of the
federal securities laws. 184 The SEC could require financial firms to disclose
the results of corporate social audits or corporate social responsiveness
through proxy disclosures or regularly required disclosures.1 85
Financial firms have admitted that the previous regulatory environment
exposed the entire financial industry to systemic risks.186 The SEC could
require these firms to disclose corporate social audits and responsiveness as
part of Sarbanes-Oxley disclosure requirements for internal controls.1 87
178 See id. at 54 (noting that "social responsiveness" refers to the "'capacity of a corporation to
respond to social pressures"') (quoting William C. Frederick, From CSRsub1 to CSRsub2: The
Maturing ofBusiness-and-Society Thought, 33 BUS. & SOC'Y 150 (1994)).
179 See Porter, supranote 118, at (surveying the concept of corporate social responsiveness).
180 See Hess, supranote 90, at 60-61 (discussing "other constituency" statutes).
181 See id at90 67-68 (suggesting that a corporation should create and update a statement of
values).
182 See id. at 69-70 (stating that an independent and accredited auditor must verify the social
report).
183 See id. at 71-72 (noting that disclosure is a key requirement for providing information to the
market).
184 See Williams, supra note 153, at 1200-04 (stating that the SEC is authorized to "promote
regulations requiring expanded social disclosure in [an] annual proxy statement").
185 See id. at 1299-1300 (discussing models for expanded social disclosure).
186 See Kate Kelly, SEC v. Goldman Sachs: Goldman's Take-No-PrisonersAttitude, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 26, 2010, at Cl (discussing Goldman Sachs' "aggressive, take-no-prisoners trading").
187 See Williams, supra note 153, at 1207 (identifying types of disclosure the SEC might require);
see also Hess, supra note 900, at 47 (discussing the need for expanding audits to include all aspects of a
firm's social performance).
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Improved disclosures would increase market transparency for financial
products by providing information on systemic risks to the industry and
identifying potential economic harm to communities that are targeted for
loan products. Greater market disclosures also provide shareholders and
investors enhanced information on corporate social responsibility, as well
as a basis for litigation in the event disclosures violate federal securities
laws.
CONCLUSION

Is it too much to ask the management of "too big to fail" financial
institutions, which design products for personal and corporate profit, to
identify their financial products that are likely to harm the economy and the
very communities that provide the basis for their income? If select
financial firms must use taxpayer money in order to avoid dire economic
consequences, then the federal government should require such firms to
know of the possible negative consequences of their business decisions.
CSR offers a framework for "too big to fail" financial firms to maintain
heightened standards of corporate governance and social responsibility.188
If a financial firm is "too big to fail," it is also too big to not know of the
consequences of its financial decisions on the communities vital to its
financial success. 189 Even in the midst of repaying billions of dollars in
bailout funds, Wall Street appears to be headed for new record profits and
bonuses for employees. 190 However, the downstream communities harmed
by the financial instruments fueling financial firms' growth continue to
receive little attention by Wall Street.19 1 If, as a requirement for effective
corporate social responsibility, firms must identify downside or moral
hazard risks to society and disclose such risks to investors and the markets,
regulators and markets will be better able to identify society harm as a
188 See Horrigan, supra note 1044, at 517 (suggesting starting points highlighting the importance
of CSR).
189 See Porter, supra note 1188, at 83 (explaining the interrelationship between a corporation and
society).
190 See Zachery Kouwe, Wall Street on Trackfor Record in Profits, N.Y. TIMES., Nov. 18, 2009,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/l1/18/business/18wall.html ("In a report released ... by
Thomas P. DiNapoli, the comptroller of New York State, Wall Street profits in 2009 are on track to
exceed the record set three years ago, at the height of the credit bubble . . . In turn, the profits are
contributing to a resurgence of bonuses on Wall Street. Six of the top American bank holding
companies set aside $112 billion for salaries and bonuses, including deferred payments, in the first nine
months, Mr. DiNapoli reported. The six banks are Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs,
JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley and Wells Fargo.").
191 See generally Gurria, supra note 18 (exploring how companies can improve upon public
governance).
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potential consequence of consumer products.
Financial firms determined by the federal government to be critical to the
economy must take moral responsibility for the harm their financial
products cause to communities and must also be held to high standards of
corporate governance and corporate social responsibility. Experts within
financial firms that design products for personal and corporate profit ought
to know if the products sold are likely to harm the economy and the very
communities that provide the basis for their income.

